In its judgment of 25.01.2024 (C-334/22), the European Court of Justice (CJEU) clarified that a car manufacturer can prohibit the use of a sign for spare parts if it contains an element that is similar or identical to a trade mark.
On December 16, 2014, the US pop star Rihanna published several photos on her Instagram account to mark the signing of a contract that made her the new creative director of Puma. Also on display on these photos: The white sneakers that Rihanna wore at the signing, with conspicuously thick soles and characteristic ribbing. Perhaps a small teaser for the new collection that Puma would be selling in collaboration with Rihanna. Or a mistake after all? In any case, Puma only registered a Community Design that is strikingly similar to these shoes on July 26, 2016.
A registered Community Design is only protected if it is new and has individual character before the date of the filing of the application. This means in particular that the relevant specialist circles must not have been aware of an identical design at that time. However, the law grants a grace period of one year. If the designer of the design himself or a person associated with the designer discloses the design, this disclosure is not taken into account for applications within the next 12 months in accordance with Art. 7 para. 2 CDR.
However, in the present case this deadline would also have passed for the application of July 26, 2016 if the Instagram photos of December 16, 2014 were indeed a prior disclosure of the design.
A third company, which was involved in a legal dispute with Puma in the Netherlands, promptly filed a request for a declaration of invalidity of the Community Design with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) on July 22, 2019, arguing that the contested Community Design lacked novelty and individual character due to the prior disclosure.
After the EUIPO granted the request and Puma appealed against this decision, the General Court (EGC) now had to deal with the facts of the case.
Puma objected to the request and the EUIPO’s decision on the grounds that the screenshots of the Instagram photos attached to the application were not sufficient to establish a disclosure of the design that would be prejudicial to novelty. In the photos, Puma argued, Rihanna was in the foreground; the sneakers, on the other hand, were hardly noticed. The photos were too dark and blurred for anyone to be able to clearly recognize the sneakers at all. In addition, at the time of the disclosure, Instagram had not yet offered a feature to zoom into photos in the app, which made it even more difficult to see the shoes. However, according to Puma, it could be assumed that Instagram was used almost exclusively on smartphones, where the photos could only be viewed in a small size. Ultimately, it could not be assumed that all design features of the design were already disclosed by the photos.
None of these arguments convinced the court. In the opinion of the judges, the photos were of sufficient quality to recognize all decisive design features of the design. In some of the photos, the shoes and not Rihanna were clearly in the foreground. Even without the zoom feature, it was also possible to take screenshots of the Instagram photos at the time of the post in order to enlarge them outside of the app. Ultimately, due to Rihanna’s high profile, it must be assumed that both her fans and the relevant professional circles would have an increased interest in the clothing she wears in Instagram photos published in the context of the signing of a contract that makes her the new creative director of a fashion company.
The court’s decision is hardly surprising, but rather confirms the existing case law regarding prior disclosures that are prejudicial to novelty. However, the example also clearly shows that the one-year grace period can often become a stumbling block. This does not only apply to world-famous pop stars. The publication of photos of a new design on the company website or the corresponding social media channels also quickly constitutes a disclosure within the meaning of Art. 7 CDR. If no designs have been registered at this time, you should therefore always be aware that the clock for filing an application can start ticking from this publication.
The innovation landscape in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) is flourishing. This is the result of a recent analysis by the German Patent and Trade Mark Office (DPMA). Speaking in Munich, Eva Schewior, President of the DPMA, reported that the number of patent applications for Germany has risen by 40 percent over the past five years, particularly in technology classes with a strong connection to AI. The core areas of AI, including special digital computer systems and neural networks, including the associated learning methods, have even seen a tripling of applications since 2019.
This development shows that AI technologies, such as generative tools, are increasingly being integrated into everyday life and are likely to play an important role in many areas of life in the future. In addition to the core areas, the DPMA found a high level of innovation in fields such as image analysis, computer technology, medical technology and transport and vehicle technology.
In terms of patent applications for the German market, US applicants lead with a share of 32.4 percent of all applications published in 2023. Germany follows with 17.1% and Japan with 12.4%. China and the Republic of Korea show the largest increase in publications compared to the previous year.
Inventions related to AI are regularly based on mathematical models implemented as software. Patent protection for these computer-implemented methods is limited in that computer programs as such are not patentable. Instead, patent protection requires that the invention contributes to solving a specific technical problem by technical means. This contribution may, for example, relate to the control of an autonomous vehicle.
BOEHMERT & BOEHMERT has already supported and accompanied many of these AI patent applications. With our experience in the field of AI technology, we are able to advise our clients in a targeted manner and respond specifically to their needs in the dynamic environment of AI innovations.
To the chagrin of honest entrepreneurs, trade marks are sometimes misused and used against them. The aim of the applicant may be to obtain a blocking position against competitors. Alternatively, the application may be speculative, based on the hope that a company will want to use the mark for its goods or services in the future and will therefore buy or license it from the applicant.
Businesses are not unprotected against such trade mark applications. Case law divides these cases into those with and without intent to injure, under the general heading of bad faith. If, for example, a trade mark application is filed to prevent a competitor from continuing to use the trade mark, bad faith is usually present because of the intention to block and obstruct. Since the Classe E decision, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) has also assumed that there is an “abusive exploitation of a merely formal legal position” if someone
Proof of the subjective elements, i.e. proof of the applicant’s lack of intention to use, is regularly problematic in the practical application of the law.
The requirements laid down by the BGH have recently been applied by the regional courts in Stuttgart and Hamburg in several cases. A manufacturer of sports watches, represented by BOEHMERT & BOEHMERT, faced Capella EOOD, a company based in Bulgaria and represented by Mr Erich Auer. Mr Auer is well known in the trade mark scene for having registered thousands of trade marks over the years through various shell companies such as Ivo-Kermatin Ltd, Suebi Ltd and Segimerus Ltd. In the present case, he took action against the watch manufacturer and its European dealers on the basis of one of these many trademarks. The case concerned a sports watch offered under the same name as the trade mark. In response to these warnings, we issued a letter of cease and desist to Capella EOOD on behalf of the watch manufacturer for unauthorised warnings of intellectual property rights. This is because a claim for injunctive relief under trademark law is precluded by the defence of abuse of rights in the case of an application made in bad faith, i.e. it cannot be enforced in the long term.
The Regional Court of Stuttgart had to decide and issued a preliminary injunction against Capella, which we had applied for and which it confirmed on opposition (judgment of 18 October 2023, 32 O 73/23 KfH, not yet final). The difficulty in the proceedings was to establish that the trade mark applicant had no subjective intention to use the trade mark and was acting in bad faith based on the objective circumstances of the case. The following facts indicated that the applicant had never intended to use the trade mark itself in its own business or for third parties on the basis of a consultancy concept: no external marketing efforts were made, no comprehensible business model or trade mark concept could be presented, and the trade mark was transferred back and forth between Erich Auer’s various companies. In addition, the applicant cancelled the majority of its trade marks after the expiry of the official deadline for the payment of fees. All in all, there was every indication that he had hoarded the trade marks essentially for the purpose of obtaining injunctions and damages against third parties using identical or similar designations. This constituted an abuse of the formal legal position of the trade mark proprietor. The Stuttgart Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed Capella’s appeal against this decision on the grounds that it was obviously unlikely to succeed under Section 522(2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) (decision of 27 February 2024, 2 U 187/23).
This is not the first decision in which Mr Auer’s business model has been found to be dishonest. Only recently, the General Court of the European Union also found bad faith in one of his trade mark applications – in this case by Copernicus EOOD (General Court, judgment of 17 January 2024, T-650/22 – ATHLET).
In its judgment of January, 25 (C-334/22), the CJEU clarified that a car manufacturer can prohibit the use of a sign for spare parts if it contains an element that is similar or identical to a trademark.
Audi’s well-known four-rings trademark is registered in the EU for vehicles and spare parts, among other things. A Polish dealer was selling copied radiator grilles intended for older Audi vehicles. The radiator grilles contained an element whose shape is similar or identical to the Audi trademark and is also intended for mounting the four-ring trademark.
In 2017, Audi took action against this dealer in Poland. The aim was to obtain a ban on marketing copied radiator grilles of the aforementioned type. The Polish court referred the case to the CJEU with the request to clarify whether the marketing of replacement car parts at issue (specifically: radiator grilles) constituted “use of a sign in the course of trade” that could impair the functions of the Audi brand. Furthermore, the national court wanted to clarify whether the owner of this trademark can prohibit a third party from such use.
In its judgment, the Court affirms this. It states that in the present case, the radiator grilles did not originate from the trade mark proprietor and had been placed on the market without its consent. The part intended for affixing the Audi emblem was integrated into the radiator grilles for their marketing by the third party. It is therefore visible to the public wishing to purchase such a spare part. This could constitute a factual link between the spare part in question and the owner of the AUDI mark. Therefore, such use could impair the functions of the trademark (including the origin or quality of the goods).
However, the specific legal dispute still has to be decided by the court in Warsaw, which is bound by the legal opinion of the CJEU. The CJEU left it to the Polish court to examine whether the disputed part on the radiator grille is identical or similar to the Audi brand.
Should Audi actually prevail in the proceedings, the practical consequence of the ruling is likely to be that radiator grille manufacturers will in future maintain a significant distance from (automotive) brands when designing corresponding products in order to avoid brand collisions.
This article first explains how the Supreme Court limited the scope of permissible re-use. It then outlines current approaches in German case law regarding the adaptation and transformation of copyrighted works.
The decision of the US Supreme Court was based on a portrait of the musician Prince that Andy Warhol produced as a silkscreen from a photograph taken by the plaintiff, Lynn Goldsmith. By licensing “Orange Prince” to the media company Condé Nast, the Andy Warhol Foundation had infringed the photographer’s copyrights.
The legal issue was the doctrine of fair use. This is set out in Section 107 of the US Copyright Act. The fair use doctrine is a four-factor test of whether a copyrighted work has been fairly used: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The Supreme Court looked at the first factor. This factor considers whether the new work is being used for commercial or nonprofit educational purposes, and whether the transformation has added something new, such as an additional purpose or a change in character. Based on these criteria, the court rejected fair use and thus upheld Goldsmith’s claim. The key factor was that Warhol’s work had been used commercially. Furthermore, the modified portrait did not represent something fundamentally different or new. Not every slightly modified copy could enjoy copyright protection, otherwise it would be circumvented and thus undermined.
The court of first instance had accepted fair use on the grounds that Warhol had changed the character of the photograph. This is because Prince appears vulnerable in the photograph, but iconic in the image. The work was therefore immediately identifiable as a “Warhol” work. Supreme Court Justice Kagan’s minority opinion also follows the classic utilitarian approach. She fears that the majority decision will stifle creative progress and undermine creative freedom.
In Germany, two approaches to such borderline cases – between exclusivity and freedom of access – are currently conceivable:
First, the approach of the Federal Court of Justice: For adaptations or other modifications of a work, Section 23(1) Act on Copyright and Related Rights (UrhG) provides that the author’s consent is not required only if the newly created work maintains a sufficient distance to the work used. According to the Porsche 911 decision of the Federal Court of Justice, this so-called free use requires that “in view of the uniqueness of the new work, the borrowed personal characteristics of the protected older work fade away”. Fading in this sense occurs when the new work is so distant that the personal characteristics of the old work recede. The use of the older work may only appear as an inspiration for a new, independent work (BGH, judgement of 7 April 2022 – I ZR 222/20, § 43). In some instances, this case law even permits the clear adoption of the older work, provided that this is necessary for the artistic creation.
The Higher Regional Court of Hamburg recently took a different approach: the reproduction of the song “Metall auf Metall” and its transformation into an independent new work by means of sampling falls under the term pastiche within the meaning of Section 51a UrhG and is therefore a legally permissible use (judgement of 28 April 2022 – 5 U 48/05). The Federal Court of Justice stayed the subsequent appeal proceedings (case I ZR 74/22) and referred the question to the European Court of Justice.
Whichever way you look at it, the BGH and OLG Hamburg seem to have internalized the mantra “Cultural creation must build on the earlier work of other authors” more than the US Supreme Court. Over here in Germany, the Warhol case might have ended differently.
Few issues have been as ubiquitous in recent years as climate change. The crisis is in the news every day. No wonder, then, that the climate is also making waves in competition law: greenwashing – as the demand for environmental friendliness increases, so does the attraction for companies to advertise with such terms, and the potential for misleading.
Consumers want to live green: According to recent studies, 88% of global respondents say they would buy sustainably if given the opportunity; 77% want to spend money only on brands with green and sustainable advertising within the next five years’ time (dentsu, The Rise of Sustainable Media, 2021). 73% of Gen Z are even willing to pay more for sustainable products (First Insight, The State of Consumer Spending: Gen Z Shoppers Demand Sustainable Retail, 2020). There is a shift in consumer expectations. Sustainable products and services are increasingly in demand with a high willingness to pay. Many companies are seizing this opportunity. Advertising sustainability is becoming a selling point.
In many cases, however, advertising promises are not kept. In 2021, the EU Commission analysed company websites for their environmental promises. 37% of websites advertise sustainable, environmentally friendly or carbon neutral companies and their products or services, but in reality they are not or only partially sustainable. 59% of sites contain unsubstantiated information, making the promises unverifiable. According to the analysis, a total of 42% of websites violate the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (EU Commission, Screening of Websites for ‘Greenwashing’: Half of Green Claims Lack Evidence, 2021). The competition authorities and consumer associations in particular want to remedy these shortcomings and are committed to protecting consumers and the environment. As a result, greenwashing is increasingly becoming the subject of legal proceedings. These proceedings are based on Sections 5 and 5a of the German Unfair Competition Act (UWG). According to these provisions, business activities are misleading if they contain untrue statements or other statements that are likely to mislead, in particular with regard to the essential characteristics of the product or service. The relationship with the environment is one such essential characteristic, as it relates to the nature of the product.
Environmental claims are in principle allowed. However, as in the case of health advertising, they are subject to strict legal standards—following a ruling by the Federal Court of Justice in the 1980s. The main reason for this is the emotional appeal of sustainability advertising. It arouses consumers’ concern for their own health and a sense of responsibility for future generations.
The risk of being misled is particularly high with terms whose meaning and content are (still) unclear: environmentally friendly, sustainable, organic, to name but a few. There is an increased need for clarification on the part of the target public. A clearly visible, informative label is therefore required. The stringency of this label will be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the type of product and the degree and extent of its environmental friendliness. In the case of relative sustainability, for example, the respective advantage of the product must be explicitly stated (Higher Regional Court Bremen, judgement of 23 December 2022, 2 U 103/22). Climate or CO2 neutrality is understood by the courts to mean a balance of CO2 emissions, which can be achieved either through avoidance or through compensation. In the case of compensation measures, it must be explained in the advertising whether, for example, CO2 certificates have been purchased or third-party climate projects have been supported. If a quality label is used, information on the test criteria must be provided (Higher Regional Court Frankfurt/Main, judgement of 10 November 2022, 6 U 104/22). As far as the scope of information requirements is concerned, it is generally true that consumers become more interested in details the more prominent an issue becomes in their minds. And climate change is currently omnipresent.
Advertising with environmental claims is lucrative for companies. But caution is needed. To avoid misleading consumers, an informative reference to the more detailed circumstances to which the claim refers is usually required. Companies should therefore be specific about the benefits of their product or service. The reference must be consistent, clear, and easily readable. Eco-labels must also be accurate and verifiable.
In the future, companies should keep abreast of current legislative projects in this area. The EU Commission is committed to climate protection. There are proposals to amend the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to empower consumers for environmental change through better protection against unfair practices and better information (COM/2022/143) and for a Directive on environmental claims (COM/2023/166). In addition, the financial market will be incentivised as it can direct capital flows towards sustainable investments to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth. The Disclosure Regulation (EU 2019/2088) in conjunction with the Taxonomy Regulation (EU 2020/852) are particularly relevant.
On 13 October 2022, the Administrative Council adopted changes to Rules 46, 49, 50, 57, 65, 82, 126, 127 and 131 of the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention (CA/D 10/22). The amendments concern, inter alia, Rules 126(2), 127(2) and 131(2) EPC which relate to the notification of documents served by the EPO by postal services and by electronic means, and to the calculation of periods triggered by the notification. New Rules 126(2), 127(2) and 131(2) EPC enter into force on 1 November 2023 and apply to documents served by postal services or electronic means on or after that date.
These amendments remove the 10-day notification fiction according to the current Rules 126(2) EPC and 127(2) EPC, according to which a document is deemed to be served successfully on the tenth day after the date stated on the document, which is taken into account in calculating periods triggered by the notification of communications from the EPO. Instead, new Rules 126(2) and 127(2) EPC provide for a new notification fiction, according to which postal and electronic notification are deemed to occur on the date of the document. The EPO expects that the new notification fiction will result in a simplification for users since it brings the EPC and PCT notification regimes closer together.
Amended Rules 126(2) and 127(2) EPC also govern the burden of proof in exceptional cases in which notification of the documents is in dispute. As before, the EPO retains the obligation to prove the fact and the date of delivery in such instances. If the EPO is unable to prove that a document was delivered to the addressee within seven days of the date it bears, a so-called “safeguard” will be applied, resulting in that a period triggered by the deemed receipt of that document will be extended by the number of days by which these seven days are exceeded. The general principles governing time-limit extensions set out in Rule 134 EPC will apply to the period recalculated applying this safeguard.
Rule 131(2) EPC has been adapted to the effect that the rule now explicitly refers to the fiction of notification of the documents as the relevant event for the purposes of time limit calculation.
Amended Rules 126(2), 127(2) and 131(2) EPC are intended to take into account the principle of instantaneous notification in the digital world. The EPO mailbox is deemed a reliable service available to all professional representatives and applicants in the EPC contracting states and covering 99% (by volume) of all documents issued by the EPO. For applicants and representatives, new Rules 126(2), 127(2) and 131(2) EPC impose a change in the practice of recording time limits and thus also the training of staff, in particular with regard to the handling of exceptional cases in which notification of the documents is in dispute, even if the latter are unlikely to occur in daily practice.
Important URLs:
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2023/03/a29.html
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2022/11/a101.html
The Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) decided in June that all “developing countries” can waive the protection of intellectual property necessary for the production and distribution of Covid 19 vaccines, including all processes, technologies and ingredients required for this (“TRIPS Waiver”). The term “developing country” is so broad in this context that it even includes the People’s Republic of China.
What is the TRIPS Agreement? The WTO states on its website: “The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property (IP). It plays a central role in facilitating trade in knowledge and creativity, resolving trade disputes over IP, and ensuring that WTO Members have the leeway to achieve their domestic policy objectives. It frames the intellectual property system in terms of innovation, technology transfer, and public welfare. The agreement is a legal recognition of the importance of the links between intellectual property and trade and the need for a balanced intellectual property regime. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm.
The coronavirus pandemic reignited the global debate over whether the multilateral trade regime protecting intellectual property rights (IPR) was restricting access to important medical products. The AIDS crisis in Africa was admittedly a negative example, where pharmaceutical companies (exploited) their monopoly and stood in the way of access to affordable AIDS medicines in Africa. Today, we are faced with unequal distribution of vaccines and medicines around the world. Patents have a “bad name” in this context. That is why, despite the flexibilities already enshrined in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), India and South Africa, along with a large number of developing countries, submitted a proposal in October 2020 for a temporary waiver in response to Covid-19, which has now been adopted by the Ministerial Conference. However, the reasons for the unequal distribution of Covid vaccines and medicines are not unique to patents. In fact, they are manifold, ranging from poor health structures to inadequate information campaigns to insufficient logistics on the ground. Poorer countries lack production expertise and capacity, and the ability to maintain the necessary refrigeration until the vaccine reaches the patient. There is also the injustice of unequal distribution, as richer countries have secured vaccines early through procurement contracts. It is not about patents. This is also why the TRIPS Waiver will not help at all to provide access to vaccines and medicines.
The pharmaceutical and biotech industries have been surprisingly silent on this issue, at least in terms of public discussion. Can the industry sit back because “only” Covid-19 vaccines are affected, or because the TRIPS Waiver falls short of the original requirements? No, because no matter how the TRIPS Waiver was specifically designed, it sends the wrong signal to the public. The TRIPS Waiver seems to confirm the narrative that patents stand in the way of equitable access to medicines, only maximize the profits of pharmaceutical giants, and cause millions of people to die. After all, if this were not so, why would the WTO, including the U.S., Europe and Germany, decide to abandon patents?
We should not sit back, because the same forces are now seeking an extension of the TRIPS waiver to all therapeutics and diagnostics that are helpful to Covid-19 patients. This applies to therapeutics that are effective against SARS-CoV-2, but also against other viruses, and likewise to therapeutics that can generally reduce mortality in covid patients, but are by no means specific to covid. This would include drugs for sepsis or pulmonary edema, but also immunosuppressive or anti-inflammatory drugs, IL-6-Ras, etc. There is a very good chance that the TRIPS waiver will be extended accordingly.
Cui bono? Certainly not the patients in developing countries, because the lack of access to medicines is due to unfair distribution, not patents.
Qui nocet? Certainly it hurts the system that provided the life-saving vaccines in such a short time. It will affect funding for smaller, innovative biotech companies. It may also affect other technical areas. If the message is that patents must be abandoned when humanity relies on a particular technology, what about technologies related to climate change mitigation and alternative energy, for example?
Public discussions lead to public perception and thus to political decisions. If we don’t like political decisions, we have to leave our “IP bubble” and participate in public discussions.
After the Munich District Court asked for clarification, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has commented on German court practice regarding preliminary injunctions in patent infringement cases where the validity of the patent in question has not already been confirmed in opposition or nullity proceedings. While the ECJ ruling seems to favor patent owners, it remains to be seen whether the ruling will actually lead to a change in the practice of the German courts.
In its judgment of April 28, 2022 (Case C-44/21), the ECJ ruled that a court practice that in principle rejects interim injunctions in patent infringement cases where the validity of the patent in question has not (yet) been confirmed in first instance opposition or revocation proceedings is incompatible with European law. Furthermore, national case law that is incompatible with this judgment may not be applied by the competent courts.
The reason for the Munich Regional Court to ask the ECJ for a decision was the adoption by the Munich Higher Regional Court of a practice already applied by other courts in a high number of patent cases. According to this practice, preliminary injunctions in patent infringement proceedings are regularly rejected by the courts if the validity of the granted patent has not already been unsuccessfully challenged at least in the first instance proceedings. This has led to criticism, as patent owners have found themselves unable to obtain a preliminary injunction against an infringer if the validity of their patent had not previously been challenged – a circumstance over which the patent owner has no direct influence. Both the development and the current practice in this regard vary from court to court.
The ECJ decision has caused quite a stir and has been widely criticized.
For example, in his opinion (GRUR 2021, 466) on the order for reference of the Munich Regional Court (21 O 16782/20), the presiding judge at the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, Dr. Thomas Kühnen, criticized the fact that the case law in question had not been accurately reproduced by the Munich I Regional Court in the order for reference. The exceptions developed by this case law, in which a temporary injunction can be issued despite unexamined legal status, were incorrectly presented as conclusive, and the reasons which led in the case law in question to not issue a temporary injunction in patent matters simply for the sake of the granted patent were not discussed. It was also disregarded that only one out of three patents survives an attack on the validity of the patent. The technically often very complex subjects of invention are frequently not reliably verifiable for an infringement court staffed only with legal experts as to whether they are new and inventive compared to the prior art. The principle of proportionality must also be observed in Directive 2004/48/EC (Enforcement Directive), so that the interests of the alleged infringer must also be taken into account when deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. The approach of the LG München I, he argues, takes the grant of the patent and its technically amateurish review by the infringement court as the basis for whether or not the patent is provisionally enforced, and therefore does not make any assessment of the circumstances of the individual case.
Pichlmaier, presiding judge at LG München I (GRUR 2021, 557), responds to this comment and rejects the criticism of the incorrect presentation of the facts. The order for reference was merely based on the case law of the Munich Higher Regional Court, which had been correctly reproduced and which, for example, unlike the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, ¬ assumed conclusive exceptions. Moreover, the subject of the submission was the practiced principle of the OLG case law and not an individual question. The error rate of the patent offices cited by Kühnen, which often leads to a destruction of the patents in retrospect, was not mentioned in the OLG case law and thus was not taken into account in the submission. The argument of technical complexity cited by Kühnen could only apply to individual cases, but could not be used for the principle developed in the case law in question. This argument had also not been mentioned in the case law of the Munich Higher Regional Court.
The presiding judge at the BGH Deichfuß also notes (GRUR 2022, 800) that the ECJ in its decision had proceeded from a factual situation incorrectly reproduced by the LG München I in its order for reference. According to this decision, the issuance of a preliminary injunction for patent infringement “regularly” requires that the patent for the injunction has already survived opposition or nullity proceedings in the first instance; existing exceptions are not applied. This paints a false picture of German case law practice. However, it follows from the recitals and provisions of the Enforcement Directive that a schematic approach is prohibited, which results in the requirement for legislation and national courts to duly consider all objective circumstances of the individual case. Since the case law to date is completely different from that reproduced in the order for reference of the Munich Regional Court I, the decision of the ECJ does not give any reason to deviate from the previous case law practice; this is factually convincing and should be retained.
This ruling is also viewed critically in the literature. Although the decision is considered to be consistent (Keßler/Palzer in EuZW 2022, 562), it is noted, similarly to Kühnen, that German case law is significantly more differentiated than assumed by the ECJ decision. The ECJ answered a reference question that in fact did not arise in this form, which is why it is doubtful whether the court practice will change. In any case, there was no compulsion under EU law to adapt, since the Enforcement Directive did not require enforcement of intellectual property rights at any price, because all measures made possible by it were subject to proportionality. This is due to the fact that the enforcement of intellectual property rights regularly leads to collisions of conflicting fundamental rights. Doubts as to the existence of rights must therefore be taken into account in the context of the balancing of interests required by this reservation. In addition, the threat of liability under Section 945 of the German Code of Civil Procedure would sufficiently inhibit the patent proprietor’s frivolous application for preliminary injunctions.
It is further noted (Schmitz/Zilliox in GRUR-Prax 2022, 314) that although the ECJ rightly points out that a presumption of validity applies to patents as of the publication of their grant, the case law developed by the higher regional courts in practice leads to the refusal of interim relief for granted patents because the courts generally reject the urgency due to the lack of a validity procedure. With the present ruling, it is to be expected that the number of applications for injunctions based on patents without a completed validity procedure will increase. Whether the courts will be more generous in issuing preliminary injunctions in the future as a result of the ruling seems questionable, since the national judges had understandable
reasons for setting high requirements for the legal validity of the patent for invalidity. Moreover, the securities in favor of the defendant mentioned by the ECJ would practically rarely provide sufficient protection against the economic consequences of an unjustified injunction. All in all, one of the main hurdles for applicants seems to have been removed and there is now at least the possibility of obtaining a rapid injunction in preliminary injunction proceedings, even if the legal validity is uncertain.
Overall, it therefore remains to be seen whether the ECJ ruling will actually lead to a change in case law.
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